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of self-defense

has

INTRODUCTION

Unlike other defenses/

the

permissibility

hardly been the subject of controversy . 2 Philosophers and lawyers have
tended to agree not only

that

i t is permissible, but about the sorts of

cases to which its permissibility applies . Even supposed marginal cases,
such as attacks by insane or incompetent aggressors, have not gener
ated much controversy, and a general consensus in favor of permissibil
ity in such cases has emerged. 3 A certain class of cases of recent inter*
Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank
Kurt Baier, Meir Dan-Cohen, Peter Detre, Joshua Dressler, George Fletcher, David Gauthier,
Sanford Kadish, and Bailey Kuklin for comments on drafts and for discussions on the topic of this
article.
1. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 10.3 .1 (1978) (arguing
that duress expresses theory of excuses that could absorb entire criminal law); Mark Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 643-44 (1981)
(arguing that duress defense represents severe threat to ordinary criminal law discourse).
2. Even some pacifists accept the permissibility of self-defense. See Cheney C. Ryan, Self
Defense, Pacifism. and the Possibility of Killing, 93 ETHICS 508, 510 (1983) (arguing that prob
lem of self-defense for the pacifist is not problem of whether self-defense is permissible, but rather
of why it is permissible).
3. See generally George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REv. 367 (1973); Jeff McMahan, Self-De
fense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252 (1994); Judith J. Thomson,
Self-Defense, 20 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991). But see Michael Otsuka, Ki/ling the Innocent in
Self-Defense, 23 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 74 (1994) (arguing that impermissibility of killing innocent
bystanders entails that of killing innocent threats and insane aggressors).
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est among legal commentators, however, pressures the rationale for the
defense and suggests the need for reexamination . This is the class of
killings of abusive partners at the hands of their victims, where self
defense as traditionally understood is often inapplicable because the ag
gressor's attack was not sufficiently imminent or certain to occur.4 We
might think of these as

near

defendant is

by the desire to protect herself against unlawful

motivated

self-defense cases, that is, cases in which a

aggression, but in which her l egal claim of self-defense fails because
one or more of the legal requirements for the defense is not met.11
In focusing on what I am calling "near" self-defense cases, I am
laying to one side two other types of cases . On the one hand, I l eave
aside cases in which the defendant's claim falls squarely within the pa
rameters of traditional self-defense doctrine.6 While courts may not al
ways have recognized the applicability of self-defense to such situa
tions,7 the obj ections to such cases are practical and political, not
philosophical . On the other hand, I do not address cases in which a
victim of abuse kills her abuser where the defendant would more ap
propriately assert one of the other standard legal defenses , such as in
sanity or provocation .8 Such cases raise no question of interest for the
doctrine of self-defense.
If we restrict our focus to

near

self-defense cases, the following

difficulty emerges. Courts and commentators have come increasingly to
believe that the right of self-defense should extend to a number of cases

4. See, e.g, State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1 989) (holding self-defense instruction
properly denied for defendant who shot husband while latter was sleeping).
5 . Near self-defense should not be confused with the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The
latter refers to cases in which a defendant is unreasonable in his belief in the need for defensive
force. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 207 (2d ed. 1 995) (defining imperfect
self-defense as killing with unreasonable belief that factual circumstances justify killing ) . I leave
such cases out of what I am calling near self-defense. Imperfect self-defense, moreover, is only a
doctrine of mitigation. See State v. Powell, 4 1 9 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1 980) (allowing imperfect self
defense to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter ) . The cases of near self-defense we shall
consider, however, will be those in which a complete defense seems warranted.
6. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 1 40 U. PA L. REv. 379, 384 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (presenting evidence that major
ity of cases where battered women kill fit model of standard, confrontational self-defense).
7. See id. (arguing that high reversal of battered woman self-defense cases is due to trial
judges' "refus[al] to apply long-standing principles of substantive, evidential, and procedural
law").
8. See, e.g., State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 4 2 1 (La. Ct. App. 1 985) (rejecting battered woman
syndrome as supportive of insanity plea when defendant pleaded not guilty to manslaughter by
reason of insanity); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1 98 1 ) (admitting expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome to support possible defense of provocation); State v. Briand, 547 A.2d
235 (N.H. 1988) (same) .
.
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in which the traditional legal requirements for the defense are not
met. 9 The refusal to allow Judy Norman's claim of self-defense to go to
a jury, for example, has provoked widespread criticism, despite Nor
man's evident failure to satisfy the imminence requirement.10 While the
sense that defendants like Norman merit exoneration may not be uni
versally shared, it appears to be sufficiently common to raise the follow
ing question: Is there a coherent account of self-defense that would ex
tend the defense to cases like Norman's, where the defendant is clearly
motivated by self-preservation , and indeed where her fear for her life
seems reasonable under the circumstances ? The sort of account re
quired is a highly subjective one, focusing on defendants' reasons for
acting over and above the objective elements of their situations . M y
question, then, is about the theoretical

rationale

for a defense with this

shape. In what follows, I shall argue that if self-defense is to be con
ceived primarily as a defense based on reasons for acting, it must be
understood quite differently from the way i n which self-defense is com
monly viewed . The common view, articulated in different variations, is
that self-defense is a

justification.

This view of self-defense is so widely

shared that it is espoused by lawyers and philosophers, rights-based
theorists and utilitarians alike . 11 In this article, however, I s ketch a
view which challenges this received wisdom, one that would regard the
right to kill in self-defense as a weaker right than has been tradition
ally supposed . On the view I trace, self-defense should be thought of as
a species of

excuse,

in particular, a kind of excuse I shall call "rational

excuse. " 12
The claim that self-defense should be conceived as an excuse will
depend most heavily on arguments

against

a j ustification picture of

9. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 3 7 1 ( 1 993).
1 0. State v. Norman, 378 S.E. 2d 8 (N.C. 1 98 9). Judy Norman killed her husband while he
was sleeping, following a prolonged and vicious beating and threats by him to kill her, and fearing
a resumption of violence when he awoke. Although an intermediate appellate court held the trial
court's failure to instruct on self-defense was improper, the Court of Appeals reinstated the trial
court's verdict on grounds that the imminence requirement was not satisfied.
II. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1 0.5.4; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR..
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1 986); Sanford H . Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights
in the Criminal Law, 64 CAL. L. REv. 8 7 1 ( 1 976); Thomson, supra note 3 .
1 2. Only one other commentator, t o m y knowledge, has argued that self-defense should be
thought of as an excuse. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Histor
ical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. II ( 1 986). One essen
tial difference between our approaches is that Rosen would allow the excuse for unreasonable
actors, whereas I would not.
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self-defense. The initial implausibility of this negative claim may stem
from a certain equivocation about the meaning of the term "justifica
tion." Justification appears to be broader in ordinary l anguage than it
is in the criminal law. In the criminal law, to call a violation of a pro
hibitory norm

justified is to say not only
encouraged. In ordinary language,

that it is

it is

by contrast, to say an act is

permissible,

but that

justified is to say only that it is permissible. Moral philosophers have
mostly followed ordinary usage in this regard . 1 3 The common and phil
osophical senses of justification should therefore be understood as ap
plying to

all

of the criminal law's justifications, plus the intermediate

category I call "rational excuse." The claim that killing in self-defense
is not

justified

killing will seem less counterintuitive in the narrower,

criminal law sense of the term .
O n the excuse side, the initial implausibility of m y thesis will stem
from the fact that excuses are normally associated with lack of respon
sibility. I wish to suggest the applicability of excuse, however, where
there is no relevant psychological impairment. Excus e should be availa
ble in cases where the ground for exoneration lies i n the content of an
agent's reason for doing what she did . Rational excuses thus share a
characteristic with justifications : they apply to actions

son,

done for a rea

where the excuse itself provides the reason for the violation of the

prohibitory norm. 14 As I shall argue, however, a defense which falls in
this category lacks the primary identifying characteristic of justifica
tions in the criminal l aw - the endorsement of the agent's behavior.
Elsewhere I have suggested that the defense of duress should also be
thought of as exoneration of intentional, nonjustified conduct. H > In this
sense, defenses like duress and, as I argue, self-defense, are situated
between ful l moral endorsement and lack of responsibility.
M y argument will proceed as follows . In the next part, I argue in
favor of the law's motivation-based approach to self- defense, rej ecting
what I call the "bifurcation strategy," namely a position that treats a
purely motivation-based defense under

the

heading

of "putative,"

1 3. While she does not explicitly use the term "justification," Judith Thomson contrasts an
action's being excused with an action's being permissible. The suggestion as far as justification is
concerned is that a justification is a mere permission to do a prohibited act. Thomson, supra note
3, at 283.
1 4. I mean here to reject the possibility that the act is done for a reason under a different
description from the one to which the excuse applies.
1 5. See Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 25 1 ( 1 995) (arguing for a conception of duress as an excuse not premised on lack of
responsibility). The label "rational excuse," however, is new to this article.
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rather than actual, self-defense. I also argue, however, that the bifurca
tion theorists are right to rej ect the motivation-based account of justifi
cation . These two theses in combination entail that self-defense should
be thought of as an excuse. In part I I I , I turn to the wider philosophi
cal background to the notion of j ustification. I consider

a

conception of

justification which, like the view of rational excuse for which I argue,
focuses on agent-motivation, namely the Hobbesian conception . Insofar
as it combines a focus on motivation with the justification picture of
self-defense, the Hobbesian view represents the position towards which
modern law tends. But the law does not take a consistently Hobbesian
approach. Instead, it stands midway between the Hobbesian view and
an older, quite limited picture of justification, one that regards j ustifi
cation as sharply limited to state action undertaken on behalf of collec
tive welfare. In part IV, I offer a possible philosophical rationale for
the older, more limited conception: other-regarding actions undertaken
in defense of certain interests have a moral priority over comparable
self-regarding actions . Insofar as it is self-regarding, on this view, kill
ing or harming another in self-defense cannot be justified; it can, how
ever, be permitted under the moral framework of

excuse.

In part V, I

explore the doctrinal implications of conceiving of self-defense as a mo
tivation-based excuse. Finally in part V I , I return to the battered wo
man cases that prompted our investigation, arguing that the notion of
"rational excuse " helps to resolve the tension between intuition and
doctrine in such cases.
II.

A.

DEFENSES F O R BATTERED W OMEN WHO KILL

Self-Defense on a Justification Theory
In his contribution to the present symposium, George Fletcher ar

gues that the central legal requirements of self-defense should be un
derstood as mandated by the defense's nature as a justification .16 The
imminence requirement, for example, establishes the essential dividing
line between retaliatory and defensive behavior.17 The requirement that
the original use of force be unlawful is explained as ensuring that de
fensive force is employed as a matter of right .18 Similarly, the necessity
requirement distinguishes j ustified from merely tolerated or excused

16.
L.
17.
18.

PITT.

See George Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U.
REV. 553 (1996).
!d. at 556-57.
!d. at 558-59.
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conduct/9 and proportionality serves a similar function . 2° Fletcher's
suggestion is that defensive killing cannot be

j ustified

unless the above

conditions are met .
Let us restrict our attention for the moment to the necessity re
quirement. One line of argument against a justification picture of self
defense would run as follows:

actual

necessity is a requirement of j usti

fication. But actual necessity is not required for self-defense. This
shows that self-defense cannot be a justification.
There are two obvious avenues for rej ecting this argument. The
first is the law's solution:

actual necessity

is never required for justifica

tion. It is sufficient under prevailing American law that the defendant
had a reasonable belief in the need to use defensive force. 2 1 The second
is Fletcher's solution, namely to treat cases in which necessity is lack
ing as cases of mistaken self-defense, and then to allow for an excuse of
"putative," rather than actual, self-defense.22 It is because I side with
Fletcher on the nature of j ustification, but with the law in its focus on
the defendant' s state of mind for purposes of self-defense, that I am
drawn to the excuse picture of self-defense. Each of these elements re
quires substantiation, however .
First we must ask what reasons there might be to regard actual,
rather than merely perceived, necessity as a requirement of j ustifica
tion. As Paul Robinson has argued, j ustification is obj ective, in the
sense that it applies to cases in which no "bad act" has occurred.
Where actual j ustification is present, nothing has happened that should
attract the attention of the criminal law . 2 3 I n a case of mistake about
the availability of a justification, by contrast, a bad act

has

occurred,

and thus the law cannot j ustify the conduct if it is to exonerate the

19. !d. at 5 59 .
2 0 . !d. a t 5 5 9-60.
21. The Model Penal Code consistently allows actors to avail themselves of a justification
defense where they are mistaken about the availability of the justification, see M ODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 3.02, 3 .04 (19 8 5 ) , with the caveat that actors who are negligent or reckless in their
belief can be convicted of a crime for which the required mens rea is negligence or recklessness, as
the case may be, see M ODEL PENAL CODE § § 3 .02(2), 3 .09(2) (1985). Some commentators side
with the law's approach, dispensing with the requirement of actual necessity for justification. See,
e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1897, 1908-09 (1984) (arguing that reasonable belief is sufficient for justification); Arthur Rip
stein, Self-Defense and Inequalities of Power, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 685 (1996) (same) .
22. Fletcher, supra note 1, at § 10.1.2.
23. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM
AND CuLPABILITY (A.T.H. Smith & A. Simester eds., forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
author).

RATIONAL EXCUSE

1 996]

627

defendant. Justification is about doing good in the world, or at least
about minimizing harm.24 It applies to cases in which the defendant
has brought about no net harm, not to cases in which he merely thinks
he has done so.25 Robinson calls this the "deeds" view of justifica
tion - the view that justi fication should turn on what is done-and he
contrasts it with the "reasons " view - the view that justifications should
turn on the agent's reason for acting. Accordingly, Robinson thinks jus
tification should be available to an agent who was unaware of the exis
tence of the justification at the moment of action. In the case of self
defense, this view has few supporters .26 But accepting actual necessity
as a condition of justification does not inexorably commit one to ex
tending justifications to una ware actors. One might see justification as
requiring

both

that the agent did what would minimize harm,

and

that

she did what she did for that reason . This is obviously only a gesture in
the direction of an argument for a sensible obj ectivism about j ustifica
tion. While I cannot offer a fuller argument for the point here, I do not
have much to add to the compelling arguments others have made for
this position. For anyone already convinced of the salience of actual
necessity to j ustification, at any rate, there is an argument for treating
self-defense as an excuse.
The alternative, however, to the excuse theory is the view I pointed
to above. It is the view that consists in distinguishing "putative" from
actual self-defense, restricting self-defense to cases in which there is
actual necessity, and treating mistake cases under the theory of ex
cuse.27 I shall call this the "bifurcation strateg y . " In order for the law's
focus on motivation to provide us with a reason to turn to an excuse
theory of self-defense, then, we require an argument against the bifur
cation strategy, that is, an argument to the effect that all self-defense
type cases should be treated alike. Let us call this the "unity" require
ment. One argument in favor of such a requirement is simply that it

24. A rights-based approach to justification would of course deny this characterization. We
shall turn to such views below. See infra part I I I .
2 5 . Robinson, supra note 23, manuscript at 2. Robinson suggests that there might neverthe
less be attempt liability in such a case.
26. 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122 (1984); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 504 (2d ed. 1983) ("The law would be oppressive if it said: It is
true that you took this action because you felt it in your bones that you were in peril, and it is true
that you were right, but you cannot now assign reasonable grounds for your belief, so you were
only right by a fluke and will be convicted."). Williams does not, however, address the case of the
actor completely unaware of justifying circumstances, but rather the case of someone who has no
reasonable belief in the need to use defensive force.
27. Fletcher, supra note I, at § 1 0 . (2; Robinson, supra note 23, manuscript at 3 3-34.
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seems odd to treat differently two defendants who,

tives,

[Vol. 5 7 :62 1

from their perspec

do exactly the same thing. We would not, for example, attempt to

correct the reasoning or methodology of the "putatively" exonerated
defendant; in this sense we regard him as morally on a par with the
justified actor. But if this is true, the legal doctrines of exoneration
should be the same in both cases : both defendants should be excused or
both should be justified .
Perhaps a stronger argument in favor of the unity requirement is
that the two categories-actual and putative self-defense - do not cover
all of the cases in which we wish to exonerate defendants : they fai l , i n
particular, to cover those

near

self-defense cases which a r e n o t a matter

of potential mistake. For if, on the bifurcation strategy, we extend a
justification to defendants who actually meet the requirements for self
defense, and an excuse to those whose reasonable beliefs are such that
the conditions for self-defense would be satisfied if correct, then there
can be no defense for a defendant who acts on a motivation of self
preservation, but who, for example, does not

herself believe

the harm is

imminent. Judy Norman does not have even a claim of " putative" self
defense. Again, many may think she should not have a defense to mur
der. I am not here arguing that she should. Rather, i n view of what I
take to be a growing consensus in favor of extending a defense to a
defendant l i ke Norman, my question is whether there is a plausible
theory of self-defense that would extend the defense to her. M y point
here is simply that the notion of putative self-defense does not provide
such a theory.
In order to extend self-defense to cases where the imminence re
quirement is not even "putatively" satisfied, the preferred solution has
been to replace "imminence" with "immediate necessity," allowing a
defendant to use force in self-defense where the use of force is immedi
ately required, even if the h arm she seeks to avoid is not immediately
forthcoming.28 This solution, however, would still probably not exoner-

28. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONST. STAT § 5 0 5 (a) (1983) ("use of force upon or toward another
person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary"); M ODEL
PENAL CoDE § 3 .04 ( 1985) (actor must believe use of force is "immediately necessary for purpose
of protecting himself against use of unlawful force") . The MPC specifically intended to eliminate
the strict imminence requirement. M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3 .04, cmt. 2(c) . Courts, however, do
not appear to have accepted the relaxed time frame, even in jurisdictions which statutorily require
only "immediate necessity." Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 3 7 3-74 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987). The "immediately necessary" standard, however, appears to be the favorite of commenta
tors. See Robert F. Schopp et a!., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Dis
tinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL L. REv. 45, 66-67 (giving example of
.
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ate Norman, smce although the use of force may be eventually neces
sary under the circumstances, it may not be necessary to kill

now.

The

moment chosen might be one of any number of propitious moments for
killing someone who will almost certainly kill you if you do not kill
him . Accordingly, it has also been suggested that the imminence re
quirement might be eliminated altogether, on the grounds that the ne
cessity requirement is adequate by itself to screen out cases in which
the defense should not apply.29 The argument is that there is no reason
to require a defendant to wait until the last possible moment to avert
an attack, and that we should allow the defense whenever the defend
ant can credibly claim she would have faced serious physical harm
without the use of protective force. 30 Thus, if we wish to extend the
defense to someone in Norman's position, we would do best to side with
those

who

suggest

the

complete

elimination

of

the

imminence

requirement .
In addition, courts have increasingly adopted a subj ective ap
proach to the question of reasonableness . This is because at least a

thoroughly

obj ective approach to that question will leave out the par

ticular characteristics that might require a defendant who is much
smaller and weaker than the aggressor to use force earlier than the
hypothetical reasonable person .31 On a slightly less extreme version of
the obj ective approach, one considers whether a reasonable person in
the actor's situation would think defensive force necessary, where the

hiker in desert who will have only source of water poisoned if he does not kill second hiker now); 2
ROBINSON, supra note 26, § 13 1 (c) ( I) ("The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat
but the immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a threatened harm is such that it
cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense
must permit him to act earlier-as early as is required to defend himself effectively."); WILLIAMS,
supra note 26, at 503 ("The use of force may be immediately necessary to prevent an attack in
the future.").
29. See Rosen, supra note 9 (issue for jury should be whether defendant reasonably be
lieved defensive force was necessary, not whether threat was imminent) .
30. The added advantage of the pure necessity standard over the "immediately necessary"
standard is that the former may take care of the failure to retreat cases as well: if a defendant can
take refuge from her attacker only by remaining out of public circulation, her use of protective
force can be shown to be "necessary," although perhaps not "immediately necessary," as long as
the Iaw does not want to require her to spend the rest of her life indoors.
3 1 . See State v. Baker, 644 P.2d 365, 368 (Idaho 1 982) (instruction that would "encourage
the jury to focus upon a defendant's subjective fears . . . would be contrary to the reasonableness
requirement" for self-defense); People v. Cisneros, 110 Cal. Rptr. 269, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
("In acting in self-defense the person assailed is not entitled to act upon a subjective standard. " ) ;
State v. Cadotte, 42 P. 857 (Mont. 1895) (proper measure of circumstances justifying killing in
self-defense is reasonable person, not person in particular class of men to which defendant
belongs) .
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physical characteristics of the defendant are included in "the actor's
situation . "23 But even the more moderate test will work to the exclusion
of many of the cases we are ca lling

near

self-defense, because it leaves

out both the personal history of the defendant and the general psycho
logical effects of being subjected to years of abuse .33 On the subjective
approach, by contrast, as one court has said, "defendant's actions are
to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not those
which a detached jury might determine to be obj ectively reasonable. "34
The subjective approach thus makes possi ble not only consideration of
the pattern of abuse that the defendant has come from past experience
to expect, but also the admissibility of psychological testimony a bout
the "normal" responses of victims of battering . 311
When we combine these several aspects of contemporary self-de
fense law, the fol lowing picture emerges. In order to make a valid
claim of self-defense, a defendant need only have a reasonable belief
that the use of force under the circumstances was necessary i n order to
avert a perceived attack. Reasonableness is assessed from the defend
ant's perspective, taking into account her subjective pecu liarities and
past experiences. This turns self-defense into a defense based almost
exclusively on motivation : it says that a defendant can do whatever she
believes necessary to avert an attack by an aggressor, provided that her

32. State v. Wanrow, 5 5 9 P.2d 548, 558 (Wash. 1 98 7 ) (reasonableness interpreted so as to
allow consideration of defendant's physical vulnerability). The Wanrow case required the court
only to take a more flexible approach to objective reasonableness, although dicta in that case is
often cited in support of the subjective approach. See infra note 3 3 . For other intermediate, objec
tive approaches, see Hart v. State, 637 S.2d 1 329, 1 33 9 (Miss. 1 994) ("The defendant is judged
not according to his own particular mental frailties, but by a 'reasonable person' standard.");
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 1 67, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 989) (" [T]he reasonableness of the de
fendant's belief that self-defense is necessary . . . do [es] not call for an evaluation of the defend
ant's subjective state of mind.") .
3 3 . Wanrow, 5 5 9 P.2d at 5 5 8 . The Model Penal Code's approach is another variation of the
subjective approach: " [T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of force by such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3 . 04( 1 ) (emphasis added).
34. Wanrow, 5 5 9 P.2d at 5 5 5 .
3 5 . State v . Hundley, 693 P.2d 47 5 , 478-80 (Kan. 1 98 5 ) (correct standard i s "how a rea
sonably prudent battered wife would perceive [husband's] demeanor," but referring to this as
application of objective test); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 3 1 2, 3 1 6 (Wash. 1 984) (en bane) (evi
dence of battered woman syndrome "may have substantial bearing on the woman's perceptions
and behavior at the time of the killing and is central to her claim of self-defense"); State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 8 1 1 , 8 1 8 (N.D. 1 98 3 ) ("a correct statement of the law of self-defense is
one in which the court directs the jury to assume the physical and psychological properties pecu
liar to the accused").
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belief meets some sort of minimal standard of rationality, considered
from the standpoint of someone in the defendant's position and with
the defendant's psychological profile.
My claim, then, is simply that if one is inclined to accept the
above para meters for the defense, one should also find an excuse for
mulation attractive, insofar as it al lows one to avoid bifurcation . Meth
odologically, a nonbifurcated approach to these cases seems defensible:
one starts with the group of cases in which one is inclined to allow the
defense and then locates the lowest common denominator across all
such cases . My claim, then, is that proceeding in this way one is inevi
tably pulled towards a subj ectification of self-defense, because the low
est common denominator of the

near self-defenses

cases (at least where

exoneration seems appropriate) and the regular self-defense cases taken
together is the belief on the part of the agent that the use of force was
necessary to avert death or serious bodily injury, along w ith a j udgment
that such belief was reasonable. What I think this shows is that the
element that most strongly inclines us to allow a claim of self-defense is
the deference we accord the motivation of self-preservation, assuming
the motivation was reasonably called into play. A motivation-based de
fense, however, is one that is difficult for a j ustification picture of self
defense to accommodate. In part I I I , I shall make a more robust argu
ment for this claim, suggesting that the only clear motivation-based
picture of justification available is the H obbesian picture, and that
modern law cannot accept the implications of that view. Before I turn
to this argument, however, we must consider a bifurcation position
which would not suffer from the particular defect of Fletcher's view:
this is the claim that all of self-defense should be treated as a justifica
tion, but that at l east in the case of battered women, self-defense per se
is not required to exonerate the defendant. On this view, battered
women should be thought of as having an excuse, where the claim to
excuse falls outside the ambit of self-defense. I shall argue, however,
that this view suffers from other defects.

B.

An Excuse of Battered Woman Syndrome
6 some comW hile the theory has hardly found favor with courts,3

36. See, e.g., Hawthorne v . State, 408 So.2d 8 0 1 , 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982) (holding
that battered woman syndrome testimony only properly introduced to bear on defendant's claim of
self-defense, not to establish novel defense); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1 98 8 )
(" [N]o jurisdictions have held that the existence o f the battered woman syndrome in and o f itself
operates as a defense to murder."). But see McMaugh v. State, 6 1 2 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992 ) (sug-
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mentators have suggested t h e creation o f a special defense for battered
women, what is sometimes referred to as the defense of "battered wo
man syndrome . "37 Drawing on Lenore Walker's work in experimental
psychology which purports to show the existence of a psychological syn
drome specific to victims of domestic abuse,38 the novel defense would
claim that battered women who kill their abusers should be regarded as
lacking responsibility for their conduct. Such women , according to the
syndrome, become helpless and passive, unable to leave the relationship
and incapable of seeking help, even when help is available.
The possible legal relevance of the syndrome, however, remains
unclear. If the syndrome is meant to suggest a form of incapacity, the
most obvious candidate for a theory of legal defense is lack of volunta
riness, along the lines of defendants who perform otherwise criminal
acts while unconscious, for example, in their sleep or during an epilep
tic seizure.39 But lack of voluntariness usually means that the actor
literally cannot control her bodily movements, and this is u n likely to be
the case where the killing is conducted by an awake actor whose body
is not moved by an extern a l physical force, and where the movement is
not a reflex reaction. A claim of incapacity applicable to such cases
would thus be more like what the insane actor can claim -not that
there is no voluntary act, but that there is no mens rea, because the
defendant lacks the general capacity to form an evil intent. The more
promising suggestion of incapacity, then, is that the battered woman
has had her judgment clouded by the abuse she has suffered , and that
her ability to think rationally about her alternatives has become im
paired . I n this way, the existence of the syndrome can only constitute
the basis for a defense in its own right if there is a type of impairment
which does not imply complete loss of agency, but which nevertheless
destroys an agent's responsibility for her conduct.
An initial difficulty is this. If past experiences are to have impaired
the defendant's responsibility for conduct, they must h av e done so with
respect to everything she does, not just at the moment she kills. And no

gesting battered woman syndrome might be presented as affirmative defense to murder to defeat
evidence of premeditation).
37. See, e.g., Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1 25 3 , 1 28 0 ( 1 9 8 7 ) (arguing dimin
ished capacity proper plea for defendants displaying battered woman syndrome) .
38. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984 ) .
39. See People v. Newton, 8 7 Cal. Rptr. 394, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 970) (unconsciousness
complete defense to charge of criminal homicide as long as not voluntarily induced); People v.
Graham, 455 P.2d 153, 1 6 1 (Cal. 1969) (same).
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one has suggested, or would suggest, that a battered woman should be
exonerated for

any

illegal act she might perform, although it has been

suggested that the syndrome might have application to cases in which
women commit crimes under duress from abusive husbands.40 This un
derscores . the basic difference between the proposed battered woman
syndrome defense and the insanity defense. What the proponent of a
separate battered woman syndrome defense would require, then, is a
theory under which a sane agent 's responsibility for her conduct can be
destroyed, not in a permanent fashion, but destroyed only with respect
to a particular act she performs, where the nature of the impairment
leaves the act a voluntary one, in the sense the criminal law acknowl
edges. Can we find examples of such a psychological middle road else
where in our theory of voluntary action ?
First consider cases of accidental harm. In some such cases the
agent's behavior is intentional under

some

description, but not under

the one in terms of which the behavior is harmfu l . Thus I might stretch
my arms intentionally, but I might not slap you in the face intention
ally if I did not know that by stretching my arms I would slap you in
the face. While I am responsible for stretching my arms, I am not re
sponsible for slapping you in the face. But

this

sort of lack of responsi

bility is hardly applicable to the situation of the battered woman who
kills, since the battered woman, we a re presuming, is aware of what she
is doing, while the reason we can say I do not slap you in the face
intentionally is that I lack awareness of slapping you in the face. 4 1 In
short, since the required mens rea for murder is not purpose, but at
most knowledge, cases in which the defendant consciously controls her
bodily movements will be ones in which it will be difficult to show lack
of responsibility without alleging insanity.
Coerced acts may provide a more promising model for the middle
road the battered woman theorist needs. On one view of coercion, if a
person holds a gun to your head and threatens to kill you unless you
turn over your money, you lack responsibility for handing over your
money, even though you are aware of what you are doing, since you
hand over your money under duress. Perhaps, then, lack of responsibil40. See Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv.
603 ( 1 994) . It would be equally difficult to limit the application of the syndrome to 'near duress'
cases.
4 1 . This is at least the case in ordinary language and in the law. Philosophers have a nar
rower (indeed too narrow, as I have suggested elsewhere) understanding of the notion of inten
tional action. Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Moral Culpabil
ity: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REv. 2 1 0 1 , 2 1 04 ( 1 996 ) .
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ity can be inferred from a lack of "willingness," rather than from lack
of control.42 But I think this understanding of coerced acts is itself un

I

tenable.43 There is a clear sense in which the coercer is presenting you
with a choice: while he has severely restricted your options there are

I
r

still two things you can do under the circumstances . The point of re

'

stricting your options is of course to make one course of action vastly
more attractive to you than a nother. But this means that the coercer is
relying on your intact powers of ratiocination, since he

wants

a particu

lar course of action to recommend itself forcefully to your reason . Lack
of rationality on your part would foil his plans. It is unclear, then, how
pressure that does not destroy the possibility for intentional action is
supposed to weaken the agent's responsibility. Indeed, your handing
money over to the coercer seems more emblematic of agency than the
case in which I unintentionally hit you in the face when I put on my
coat: At least in the former case there is something you want to which
handing over money is a means, whereas in the latter, although I con
trol the movements of my body by which I hit you in the face, there is
nothing I a m seeking to accomplish by doing so.
Insofar as women who kill their abusers control their bodily move
ments and are aware of what they are doing, then, they should be
thought of as killing intentionally. The problem is that there is no co
herent theory under which some agents who act both voluntarily and
intentionally can be thought of as lacking responsibility for their con
duct. The sort of defense required is one that applies to responsible
agents, but which does not demand the stringent conditions of self-de
fense on a justification theory of the defense. The notion of a "rational
excuse " will play precisely this role -it applies to sane, responsible
agents in virtue of a j udgment made about the

content

of their reasons

for acting. We shall explore the notion of "rational excuse" further i n
part V.
III.

CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTIFICATION

Thus far we have considered approaches to self-defense, and I
have argued that the law currently adopts a motivation-based a pproach

42. Aristotle rejects the suggestion. Although he calls actions performed under duress
"mixed," he concludes that such acts are essentially voluntary, since "the principle that moves the
instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in [the man,) and the things of which the moving
principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. " ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean
Ethics, in COLLECTED WORKS OF ARISTOTLE § 1 1 1 0 (b) (3 3-34) (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) .
43. I critique this approach more fully in Finkelstein, supra note 1 5 .
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to that defense. If we side with the law on the nature of self-defense,
the question arises whether the motivation-based approach to

fense

self-de

is compatible with the background philosophical account we

might give of justification. There is one clear approach to j ustification
that hinges justification entirely on motiva tio n . This is the Hobbesian
approach.
For Hobbes, the right to act on the motive of self-preservation is
the most essential of the rights that man has outside of civil society,
and a state's ability to recognize it constitutes one of the central condi
tions of legitimate political authorit y . As David Gauthier in his contri
bution to this symposium suggests, "A legal system which failed to rec
ognize the right, which failed to recognize the j ustification each person
has to act in her own protection in the light of imminent danger, could
have no valid claim on the allegiance or obedience of those it sought to
bring within its sway. "
44 This thought is nowhere more seriously main
tained than in

Leviathan,

where H obbes argues that there are "some

rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signs to
have abandoned or transferred, " chief among them "the right of re
sisting them that assault him by force . "411 So strong is the right to de
fend one's life against attack, that it prevails even as against the sover
eign, whose powers, Hobbes makes clear, are otherwise so extensive
that "nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subj ect, on what
pretense soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury. "46 Thus if
the sovereign comes to kill me, I am at liberty to resist him, although
he does not do me an injustice in trying to kil l me. Similarly, Hobbes
says that "[i]f the sovereign command a man (though j ustly con
demned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that
assault him . . . yet hath that man liberty to disobey. "47 Hobbes ap
pears to have laid the foundation for the modern rights-based tenor of
contemporary accounts of the defense.
There is, however, a striking difference between the Hobbesian
and the modern views of justified self-defense. As commentators gener
ally agree, one mark of a justification is that the use of force in re
sponse cannot itself be justified.4 8 This aspect of j ustification can be

44.
6 1 5, 6 1 6
45.
46.
47.
48.

David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence, 57 U. PITT. L. REv.
( 1 996) .
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV, para. 8 ( 1994) ( 1 651).
Id. at ch. XXI, para 7.
Id. at ch. XXI, para 1 2.
FLETCHER, supra note I, § I 0.1. 1 .
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derived from the requ irement, specific to self-defense, that the use of
force by the initial aggressor must itself be unlawful. But for H obbes,
the fact that the sovereign is justified in trying to kill me does not mean
that I am not j ustified in resisting him. So we can have a situation in
which two agents are attacking one another, each of whom is justified .

'

r
I

Hobbes in effect rejects the requirement on justification that the use of
force be unlawful . We shall return to differences between the H obbes
ian and modern views below .49
What

is

uniquely modern about this conception is the idea that the

f

l egitimate scope of sovereignty is limited by the background, prepoliti
cal right of self-defense; in other words, that individual right provides

l

the limiting principle against which the power of the state is defined.
This follows axiomatically from the way in which the state is consti
tuted - by agreement of its putative members - and the purpose for
which such agreement is entered into - the improved security of one's
life. In other words, self-defense provides the very condition for the
willingness of individuals to leave the state of nature, and the scope of
duty to the sovereign is limited by the latter's ability to fulfill that pur
pose: "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which h e is able to
protect them. " �>0 S elf-defense on a Hobbesian view is thus the essence
of j ustification .
The law of H obbes's own day, however, and that stretching back
to the Middle Ages, suggested a very different picture of j ustifica
tion - in particular, a much narrower conception. Justified violations of
the law were restricted to those committed by state agents, either as
state officials or as private citizens representing the common good . The
person who killed accidentally, under duress, or

se defendendo,

thus fel l

outside t h e scope of justification. Accordingly, a person who had killed

per infortunium

or

se defendendo

required a pardon from the king,111

whereas a j ailer who killed an escaping prisoner or a private citizen
who killed a felon in "hue and cry"112 would be acquitted if brought to
justice at alP3 When the executioner put in motion the state's machin-

49. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
50. HOBBES, supra note 45, at ch. X X I , para. 2 1 .
5 1 . 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W . MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
479-83 ( 1 9 5 9) ( 1 895).
52. See id. at 478, 578-80.
5 3 . NAOMI D. H URNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE 1 307, at 8 8-90
( 1 969).
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ery o f death, these were not t h e acts o f a man , but the acts o f t h e state
which merely passed through the person of the executioner.
In asserting a j ustification, the n , a defendant does not attempt to
claim the law's protection for acts performed for self-interested reasons .
H e presents instead a privilege t o act as a representative o f t h e state,
and it is the common welfare rather than individual self-interest that
provides the grounds for the legitimacy of his act. Although the dispen
sation of pardons became routinized and could eventually be expected
as a matter of course where applicable,�4 the principle remained that he
who claimed a defense for actions undertaken as a private, self-inter
ested being could not demand the mantle of legal protection . Exonera
tion for such acts thus was formally a matter of mercy rather than of
j ustice,�� and one who was extraordinarily denied a pardon would have
no legal claim for redress.

defendendo

and

Exoneration for killings committed

per infortunium

se

remained a matter of pardon until rel

atively late in the history of Anglo-American l a w . �6
One finds the older view of justification in many of Hobbes's pred
ecessors. St. Thomas Aquinas clearly limits the operation of justifica
tion to state agents acting for the common good. In his Question on
murder, for example, Aquinas allows that it is permissible in general to
kil l sinners, �7 but he restricts the permissibility of such killings to those
undertaken by agents charged with the public welfare: "it is l awful to
kill a n evildoer in so far as i t is directed to the welfare of the whole
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the com
munity's welfare. " �8 And he goes on to say that "the care of the com
mon good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority:
w herefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evil-

54. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 3 13 (3d ed. 1927).
5 5 . This was set out formally i n the Statute o f Gloucester ( 1 27 8 ) which enacted that one
who lOlled se defendendo or otherwise "without felony" must plead to the justices in eyre or of
gaol delivery, and "in case it be found by the country that he did it in his defence or by misfor
tune, then by the report of the justices to the king the king shall take him to his grace if it please
him." 6 Edw. 1, ch. 9 ( 1 278) (Eng.), quoted in 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 3 1 2.
56. It was not formally abolished until 1 828. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 3 1 § 1 0 ( 1 8 28 ) (Eng.). The
Statute of Gloucester already either reflected or instituted a regularization of the pardon process;
the defendant was instructed to request pardon under the statute even though these were by then
pro forma. By the reign of Edward III, the declining importance of the power to pardon is evi
denced by the fact that the Chancellor had taken over the process. RoLLIN M. PERKINS & RoN
ALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1 1 23-24 (3d ed. 1 982).
57. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I I - I I , Q. 64, art. 2 (Benziger Brothers, Inc.,
1 948).
58. !d. at II-II, Q. 64, art. 3.
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doers to death . "119 While it is hardly surprising that Aquinas thought
public executions lawful only when conducted by public authority, the
impermissibility of private killings of evildoers must apply to other situ
ations as well, since what is unlawful can never be made lawful for
Aquinas by considerations of the greater good. 6 0 The di fficulty this cre
ates for the theory of self-defense is clear: one can never hope to justify
killing in self-defense, since this would be to allow that evil can be out
weighed . Aquinas's famous attempt to explain the permissibility of self
defense in terms of the fact that what is intended is saving one's l i fe,
while killing the aggressor is "beside the intention" 6 1 is an effort to
obviate the absolute prohibition on private killing without having to
j ustify such killing . If j ustification is the only moral principle one has
for exonerating intentional violations of a prohibitory norm, calling the
conduct "unintentional" is the only remaining route to permissibility.
As I am in effect suggesting, however, one might rej ect the antecedent
of the conditional and locate a principle of permissibil ity in excuse
instead.
What is peculiarly modern about the H obbesian view, then, is the
supposition that acts of a person,

qua

individual, self- interested being,

can be the subject of j ustification . This supposition only became possi
ble once individuals, as opposed to states, were viewed as sources of
political legitimacy. Behind the difference between the modern and the
medieval conceptions of justification lies a difference in the conception
of the relation between state and individual authority. On an older,
preindividualistic conception, there is no justification for individual self
interest, because such interest bears no separate political l egitimacy.
Although Aquinas himself does not appear to accept the suggestion,
one might instead regard a privilege accorded individuals to protect
their own, narrowly drawn interests as an expression of understanding
or toleration, rather than as a limitation on state authority.
The i mp lications of the difference between these political concep
tions for the right of self-defense are apparent: on the older conception
of state authority, any right to self-defense must be accorded, as a mat
ter of grace, by the political body itself, where the grounds for accord
ing the right are the tendency of the right to enhance social welfare.

59. !d.
60. According to Aquinas, this can be inferred from the fact that moral acts take their
species from what is intended, id. at II-II, Q. 64, art. 7 , and that the means is also intended, id. at
1-11, Q. l 2, art. 3.
6 1 . /d. at II-II, Q. 12, art. 7.
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On this view, the right of self-defense does not operate outside the
realm of law; it is only available within that realm, and exists only to
the extent required to realize the fullest well- being of the collective.
The right of self-defense is thus one asserted not over and against state
authority, but in conjunction with it. On a view which locates the
source of state legitimacy in the prepolitical rights of individuals, by
contrast, the source of justification is also prepolitical . I n according a
right of self-defense, on this view, the law merely recognizes that which
already obtains, namely a natural right to pursue one's own preserva
tion under any circumstances which threaten it.
The current state of the Anglo-American law of justification lies
midway between the Hobbesian picture of expansive j ustification for
self-interested acts and the more limited, medieval view of j ustification.
That is, there are several respects in which the H obbesian notion of
justification is stronger than its modern counterpart. As noted above, it
·
applies even in the face of force which is itself justified, so that I can be
justified in defending myself against the sovereign, even though the sov
ereign is j ustified in kil ling me.62 Moreover under our present j urispru
dence, while killing an aggressor (whether culpable or not) in self-de
fense

is

included

in

the

ambit

of j ustification,

killing

innocent

bystanders when necessary for one's survival generally is not .63 Our
current jurisprudence thus contains an asymmetry: private necessity is
recognized for kil ling unlawful aggressors, under the heading "self-de
fense," but not for actions taken against nonaggressors. This is so even
when the violation against the latter is trivial in nature, such as stealing
a loaf of bread to keep from starving. On a H obbesian view of justifica
tion, by contrast, there is no basis for restricting actions taken in de
fense of one's life to self-defense: individuals can use whatever means
are necessary to defend their lives, even those directed against non
aggressors . 64 As H obbes says, "If a man, by the terror of present death,
be compelled to d o a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because
no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. " 611 And Hob
bes goes on to apply this reasoning to cases in which "a man is desti-

62. See supra text accompanying note 48.
63. See Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 ( 1 884) (Eng) (rejecting defense of
private necessity for defendants who cannibalized innocent cabin boy in life boat) .
64. The Hobbesian rationale is thus to be distinguished from more moderate rights-based
approaches. See generally Thomson, supra note 3 (distinguishing killing of aggressors and persons
presenting an innocent threat from killing of innocent bystanders) .
6 5 . HOBBES, supra note 45, a t ch. XXVII , para. 2 5 .
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tute of food or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve
himself any other way but by some fact against the law. "6 6
The comparably weak conception of j ustification of our current ju
risprudence reflects, I think, a certain ambivalence about self-interested
reasons for acting and an uncertainty about the scope of the privilege
to which they should give rise. On the one hand, it fa ils to embrace the
wholesale privilege for self-interest of the Hobbesian picture, but it also
eschews the rej ection of the privilege of self-interest that we find in
medieval law. The uneasy compromise our l egal jurisprudence makes is
to limit the privilege of self- interested reasons to actions undertaken
against one who is himself the source of the threat to one's survival.
But it is unclear that a rationale for this compromise can be given.
Another sort of rights-based approach to self-defense more easily
explains the asymmetry between aggressors and nonaggressors : so
called "forfeiture" theorists maintain that aggressors forfeit the right
to life (or, as in Judy Thomson's famous variation, the right not to be
killed by the person attacked67) , whereas innocent bystanders do not.
But it is a well-known difficulty with such theories that it is hard to see
why innocent aggressors should be thought to forfeit such a right. The
answer typically given is that even innocent aggressors are "wronging"
the person they attack . 68 But if "wronging" is meant to imply anything
in the nature of a negative moral j udgment, it is not clear why it should
apply to innocent aggressors. If no such implication is meant, then why
should it apply only to aggressors, and not also to nonaggressing
threats ? 69 And if, indeed, one is willing to go further and apply it to
nonaggressing threats, what precisely is the basis for denying its appli
cation to innocent bystanders ? At any rate, the forfeiture theory is be
yond the scope of our present concerns, s ince we are attempting to dis
cover a rationale for a defense premised on the

motivation

of the agent

employing defensive force. In its focus on the nature of the aggressor,

66. Jd. at ch. X X V I I , para. 26.
67. See Thomson, s upra note 3.
68. Grotius, Puffendorf, and many others in this line treat the right to kill in self-defense as
requiring some injustice on the part of the attacker. But since all wish to extend the right of self
defense to cases of insane, incompetent, or mistaken aggressors, they too require a conception of
injustice which leaves a significant gap between that notion and notions like fault or culpability.
The required conception of "injustice," however, is never clearly articulated, and it is not clear it
can be. For a helpful discussion of this point, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING ch. 4
( 1 994 ) .
6 9 . For this reason, some have concluded that self-defense i s not permissible against insane
and incompetent aggressors. See generally Otsuka, supra note 3 .
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forfeiture

theories

are

not

potential

64 1

candidates

for

providing

the

sought-after rationale.
IV.

S E L F- D E FENSE O N A W E LFARIST C o NC E PTION

A rej ection of the Hobbesian picture of justification, along with a
focus on motivation, does not by itself suggest that self-defense should
be thought of as an excuse. On the picture of justification we have from
medieval law, one might argue that killing in self-defense should never
theless be considered j ustified killing, on the grounds that in self-de
fense self-interest and social welfare coincide. On what we might call
the "welfarist" conception of j ustification, violations of the law that
promote social welfare are to be encouraged, regardless of the motiva
tion with which they are performed. Although contemporary interpre
tations of "promoting social welfare" will no doubt suggest a utilitarian
account, we need not take such a view. The welfarist picture refers only
to the privileging of what it is good to do over what it is permissible to
do, a focus on well-being over rights. My claim, then, is that the tradi
tional notion of justification is welfarist. But now it remains to be con
sidered why a welfarist view of justification cannot accept self-defense
as a j ustification .
The obvious first attempt to treat self-defense in welfarist terms is
the argument that as between a wrongful aggressor and an innocent
victim, society prefers that the wrongful aggressor lose her life than
that the innocent victim lose

his.

Self-defense may thus appear to meet

the primary welfarist test, namely the endorsement of the defendant's
behavior. There are reasons, however, to reject this account of self-de
fense, the most obvious of which is the persistence of the right in cases
of insane or otherwise excused aggressors. In such cases , the law cannot
plausibly claim that it has a preference for preserving the life of the
victim, or if the claim might be heard,

sotto voce

in the case of insane

aggressors, it surely will not hold up in the case of infantile, but other
wise normal, aggressors.
But here again the asymmetry with cases of necessity is instruc
tive. An agent is typically j ustified in committing arson to save lives , or
even in killing one to save many, but never in killing one to save one.
Even the lesser evils defense, then, does not seem to take into account
relative worth of lives and so does not express a preference in the one
for-one situation . As we have seen, however, the toting up of benefits
and burdens does not always determine permissibility - I may not steal
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a loaf of bread to keep from starving.70 And this suggests that promo
tion of social welfare is not by itself sufficient to j ustify a violation of a
prohibitory norm, but that one requires "authorization " to represent
the public good before the promotion of social welfare can provide a
j ustification . Thus, if self-defense were treated in the same way as ne
cessity, it could

not

be counted a j ustification by dint of consequential

ist reasoning, not only because the lowest common denominator meth
odology makes the defense applicable to one innocent victim who kills
one excused aggressor, but also because we do not d etermine the per
missibility of action undertaken for private benefit by a weighing up of
evils.
There is, moreover, another reason for rej ecting a j ustification pic
ture of self-defense on a welfarist conception of j ustification, and this
has to do with the nature of obligation. Killing performed for the sake
of others' welfare presents a possible fulfillment of obligation: although
the law usually recognizes no duty to rescue, it would not be antitheti
cal to the nature of moral obligation to impose such a duty. Cases of
justified public necessity are ones in which such a duty would apply;
one might have a duty to burn a field to save a town or to steal a boat
to rescue a drowning chi l d . In such a case we could expla i n the j ustified
nature of the violation by saying the agent had a moral obligation to do
the prohibited thing, since an otherwise prohibited act which an agent
has an obligation to perform must be more than m erely excused; it

must

be j ustified. But killing in self-defense could never be an obliga

tion; it can at most be a privilege or a right . 7 1 A person who would
rather die than kill is surely permitted to do so, and this should be true,
even if we are inclined to regard suicide as morally prohibited. Simi
larly, a person who would rather starve to death than steal a loaf of
bread should not be thought of as under an obligation to steal the
bread. A person, on the other hand, who would rather refrain from
destroying an item of clothing needed as a tourniquet to save another
from bleeding to death

could

be acting immorally.

The asymmetrical nature of possible obligations i n the above cases
suggests that whatever right the law or morality may accord us to act
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. The situation is obviously somewhat different
in tort law, where it is generally accepted that private necessity negates fault. But even so, the
defendant is required to compensate the victim for damage to the latter's property. Vincent v.
Lake Erie, 1 24 N.W. 2 2 1 (Minn. 1 9 1 0) (requiring boat owner to compensate owner of wharf for
damage to latter when vessel tied up at wharf to find safety from storm ) .
7 1 . See McMahan, supra note 3, at 261 (suggesting that o n deontological view, decision not
to act in self-defense cancels any reason to prevent injustice of her being killed) .
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in defense of our lives is considerably weaker than the right we might
have to defend others or society at large. This is not to say that we may
not regard a person who chooses to save her life rather than be killed in
a favorable light . We might, for example, think her rational or prudent.
But the sort of goodness that inheres in prudent behavior is not much
stronger than the sort of goodness that inheres in other natural acts
required for self-preservation : j ust as we sleep when we are tired, we
defend ourselves when under attack. One deserves no special accolades
for doing what it is natural to do. By contrast, the individual who does
a good deed for a third party does something which deserves moral
praise. He does what cuts against the grain of natural selfishness. Indi
viduals are encouraged to act in defense of the common good; such
conduct is more than merely tolerated. Where disinterested pursuit of
social welfare requires a person to break the law, the law may extend
the person a j ustification . The basis for extending a j ustification, how
ever, must be narrowly drawn . It applies only where the state is un
available to act on its own behalf, since the dangers associated with
allowing individual j udgment to substitute for public j udgment are sig
nificant. For this reason, the substitution is allowed only where the con
tent of the public judgment is clear, where the individual is in an ap
propriate position to represent public welfare, and where the state is
completely and absolutely barred by circumstances from making the
judgment itself.
Where an individual's reason for violating a prohibitory norm is
self-interested, the judge of the necessity for the violation and the bene
ficiary of that act are one. By extension of the principle that no one
should be j udge in his own cause, the person who kills in self-defense is
not the appropriate judge of the j ustifiability of the use of force. From
a certain perspective, it is not only in appropriate to think of one's claim
for self-defense as establishing a j ustification ; it is outrageous. Why
should I be able to insist that the preservation of my life is important
for social welfare, j ust because it is important to

me?

This suggests

that the person who acts in self-defense should be thought of as ex
cused rather than j ustified, since his deeply interested relation to the
victim bars him from asserting the obj ective value of his act.
The heart of the position I am attempting to sketch can thus be
put as follows : a right premised on a self-regarding reason is weaker
than one premised on an other-regarding reason. Since the right to kill
in self-defense is of the self-regarding variety, it should be j urispruden
tially distinguished, for example, from the right we have to defend
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third parties, which is other-regarding. My suggestion is that the his
torical distinction between prima facie evil acts merely excused by self
interest and those j u stified by the demands of the common good cap
tures this moral difference.
V.

D O CTRINAL IMPLICATI ONS

Conceiving of self-defense as an excuse has certain i nteresting doc
trinal implications for the l egal theory of the defense . There is, first of
all, a difficulty in the justification picture of self-defense which the ex
cuse account obviates, stemming from two widely accepted features of
justification . The first is that already discussed, namely that there is no
right to resist the j ustified use of force,72 and the other is that j ustifica
tions give rise to a right of third-party assistance. 73 If these features are
taken to be essential to the notion of j ustification, however, the follow
ing problem infects cases of mistaken actors .
Suppose A attacks B, thinking erroneously, but reasonably, that B
is about to attack him. On a justification picture, then, it is not permis
sible for B to respond with force to A's attack, since A is purportedly
j ustified. But since A is wrongfully, although excusedl y , attacking, B
should have a right of self-defense against A. And this requires that we
think of A as excused, rather than j ustified . Of course for Fletcher this
would be another argument in favor of bifurcation . But if we rej ect
bifurcation, as I have argued we should,74 the preferred solution is to
regard both parties in the above case as excused .
Alternatively, one might retain the essential unity of standard and
putative self-defense within a j ustification picture by siding with Hob
bes on the question of resistance: justification need not be regarded as
silencing a right of resistance. The problem with this solution is that i t
would generate a right to resist law-enforcement officials i n t h e execu
tion of their duty, something H obbes presumably thinks he can limit to
defense of life and bodily integrity by the particularly powerful nature
of his sovereign.711 In the absence of the very strong notion of sover-

72. See supra text accompanying note 48 and sources cited therein.
73. See FLETCHER, supra note I, § 1 0. 1 . 1 .
74. See supra text accompanying notes 27- 3 5 .
7 5 . Hobbes i s slightly unclear o n this point. He suggests that the right o f resistance stems
from the fact that any covenant "not to defend a man's own body are void. " H OBBES, supra note
45, at ch. XXI, para. II. Such a principle would, in theory, limit the right of resistance only to
those things, as Hobbes suggests, "without which [a man) cannot live." /d. at ch. XXI, para 1 2.
But earlier he also suggests that a contract to be put in chains would be void, on the grounds that
the contractor "cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself." /d. at ch. XIV,
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eignty that Hobbes suggests, regarding justified force as legitimately
resisted would make political authority unwieldy, to say the least .
On a view of self-defense as an excuse, however, there remains the
foliowing problem. Since individuals have no right to respond with
force to the j ustified use of force, but they may respond with force if
the original use of force is only excused, it looks as though the original
aggressor will have the right to defend himself against the victim who
is defending herself against him . And this seems problematic, since it
produces an infinite regress of permissible uses of force. I think, how
ever, that the excuse theorist has an answer, which lies in the fact that
the original aggressor's right to defend himself is only parasitic on his
own wrongful attacking. The aggressor has a duty to desist from his
attack, and therefore his use of force against the now attacking victim
can only be legitimate to the extent it exists apart from his own wrong
ful aggression. This means that where the victim's responses are neces
sary to protect herself against attack and are proportionate to the end
of doing

so,

the original

aggressor's response to her

will

not be

legitimate.
A second potential problem emerges from the absence of a right of
third-party assistance. It is clearly permissible for third parties to come
to the aid of someone exercising a legitimate right of self-defense. And
it is commonly thought that a third-party right of assistance must be
derived from a first-party right of self-defense. But unlike justifications,
excuses do not generate rights of assistance in others. So the excuse
picture of self-defense seems problematic, for it appears to deny a right
of third-party assistance when it should allow it. But we need not ac
cept the dependence of the third party's right of assistance on the first
party's right of self-defense. On an excuse conception, the right answer
is that it is only the person whose interests are at stake that is barred
from asserting a claim of j ustification for his own self-preserving ac
tions . Third parties are justified in assisting a person wrongfully at
tacked, insofar as they are in a position to render an independent judg
ment about the necessity of using force to protect the victim of the
attack. Thus a third party can assist, and is justified in doing so, even
though the grounds for her assistance are not derivative of the first
party's right of self-protection. This helps solve a problem which is

para. 8 . The point is puzzling, because it is easy to imagine a contract to be imprisoned which
would be to the advantage of the prisoner, for example, if the alternative were death. Moreover, it
seems that the suggestion would expand the right of resistance to law-enforcement almost without
limit.
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comparable to the right of resistance problem we saw above: If the
rights of third parties

were

entirely dependent on the rights of first par

ties, there would be a problem on a justification picture o f self-defense,
since it seems as though third parties would have a right to assist actors
mistaken in their right to use defensive force,

and that this righ t would
obtain even if the third party knew the first party was mistaken. But
obviously third parties cannot ride on the coattails of first parties . The
permissibility of using force will depend entirely on the j udgment of the
third party about the merits of the situation with

which

she is

confronted .
The law has always been unsure of its response to a third party's
rights where the person asserting defensive force is reasonably mistaken
about the need to use force, and the third party knows h i m to be mis
taken. It is also unclear what a third party should do where the initial
aggressor is excused because of infancy or insanity, and w h ere the third
party is aware of the excuse. The third party should clearly not have a
right to intervene by way of assisting the mistaken a ctor ( a result that
supports the argument against calling mistaken actors j ustified) . But
the third party may not have a right to intervene on the side of the
victim either. I t is similarly unclear whether a third party can assist the
victim of an attack by an i ncompetent, and equally unclear whether she
can assist the initial aggressor against the victim's counterattack. This
ambivalence, however, is not peculiar to a n excuse picture of self-de
fense; the j ustification picture is similarly uncertain in its response. I n
general, t h e rights of third parties a r e n o t affected by the move from
j ustification to excuse.
H ere, however, is a possible exception . Suppose a third party
comes to the rescue of an individual under attack, where the third
party's welfare is j ust an extension of the first party' s, so that in pro
tecting the first party, the third party is maximizing her own i nterests
as wel l . Thus if I am a parent and my child is the individual under
attack, my defense of my child can hardly be thought a disinterested
act I perform for the sake of the common good. My welfare is so intrin
sically bound up with the welfare of my child, that one must regard my
attempt to save my child as a s elf-interested act on my part . Yet it
must be the case that I have a justification, s ince it may b e that I have
a duty to save my child, and I am clearly j ustified in doing what duty
requires. This case, then , presents a challenge to the view I have been
suggesting, since the third party's interest in the first party's welfare is
at least partially self- interested. And if it is self-interested, the defense
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should be excuse. But it is clearly unacceptable to treat a parent who
rescues her child as merely excused, and to treat her as justified if she
rescues a stranger. Apart from the obvious implausibility of such a re
sult,

what

would

we

do

with

more

distant

relatives

and

mere

acquaintances ?
I think there is, however, a basis for treating the parent as justified
when she rescues her child, despite the partially self-interested nature
of the act: the parent's behavior is still other-regarding, and thus the
action should be justified, not merely excused. Moreover, dividing the
cases in this way comports with the test from duty: the parent poten
tially has a duty to rescue her child, and the claim from duty is no
weaker here than it is with respect to a stranger; indeed, it is stronger.
This is in sharp contrast to a truly self-regarding action which, I have
suggested, cannot be the basis for duty. Kant of course thought that an
action otherwise in accord with duty loses its moral worth if it is done
for self-interested reasons , a nd thus he would argue that only the res
cue of someone the agent was not already inclined to rescue would have
moral worth .76 But on a social welfare conception of justification, the
inclination to do one's duty would not detract from the socially benefi
cial character of acts such as parents defending their children.
VI.

SELF-DEFENSE AS A RATIONAL ExcusE

B etween endorsement and lack of responsibility there is tolera
tion - toleration of an agent on the grounds that her reason for doing
what she did is comprehensible to us. To excuse conduct of this sort
does not suggest that we would wish the agent to behave the same way
next t im e - w e may view her behavior in a negative light or we may be
indifferent. It does suggest, however, that we regard the behavior as

permissible,

that we do not fault her for acting on that reason. The

notion of rational excuse is meant to occupy this middle ground.
Rational excuse is distinguishable from other sorts of excuses by
the fact that it applies to an agent's

reason

for acting. It is inapplicable

when the agent had no reason for doing what she did, i . e . when the
conduct was not intentional. It requires an inquiry into the content of
an agent's reason for acting, and asks whether we can exonerate an
agent for wrongdoing on the grounds that she did the bad deed with a
certain end in view. In the case of self-defense, the defendant claims

76. IMMANUEL
1 948, rpt. 1 956).
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she violated a norm protecting life and bodily in tegrity because she be
lieved it was necessary for her to do so for the sake of self-preservation.
Hobbes was indeed partially correct in the privileged position he as
signed to such a motive: w e are inclined to give great weight to pleas of
self-interest where survival is at issue. But Hobbes was wrong to sup
pose that this privilege need itself be thought of as supplying a basis for
justifying prima facie wrongful acts. In the absence of a duty to save
one's own l i fe, a permission to harm another for the sake of self- preser
vation need not amount to a justification for doing so.
In suggesting that an excuse of personal necessity should turn on
the content of an agent's reason for acting, I am impli citly proposing
that we conduct the fol lowing two inquiries: first, we must consider
whether the agent passes some minimum threshold of rationality - the
minimum required to view

the agent

as

having

acted

intention

ally - and second, we must determine whether the agent honestly acted
for the sake of one particular reason for acting - namely, self- preserva
tion. In the case of self-defense, however, there is a third constraint of
rationality that must be satisfied : not only must the a gent be under
stood as having acted to protect her life, but she must have been

sonable

rea

in her belief that the use of force was necessary for the accom

plishment of that end .
Some commentators who focus o n motivation i n explaining self
defense dispense with the reasonableness requirement. G lanville Wil
liams, for example, maintains that an honest belief in the need to use
defensive force, plus the satisfaction of an imminence condition is the
correct set of requirements for the defense.77 Some older cases support
the proposition.78 But a defense that consists in an evaluation of a de
fendant's reason for acting need not dispense with a normative inquiry
into whether the motivation was appropriately arrived at under the cir
cumstances . If a defendant sincerely believes that she must kill in order
to save her life under conditions that a reasonable person would not
regard as threatening, the law must reject her claim of self-defense.
The excuse-based structure need not alter the normative aspect of sub
stantive self-defense doctrine. It merely places that aspect in a different
framework.
Applying an excuse theory of self-defense to the situation of bat
tered women does not automatically result in acquittal for such defend-

77.

WILLIAMS, supra

78.

See. e.g.,

note

Granger

v.

2 6 , at 504.
State, ! 3 Tenn. 459 ( 1 8 30).
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ants . Norman may still be j udged unreasonable in her belief in the
need to use defensive force under the circumstances . The significant
advantage of the excuse formulation for defendants like N orman is that
exoneration need not imply approval. A defendant's possibly exagger
ated response to a threatening situation can be j udged as understanda
ble, and hence exonerating, even if a j ury is prepared to regard the
defendant's behavior as less than fully admirable. The framework of
excuse would thus allow flexible application of the power of a sympa
thetic jury to exonerate . In this way, the extra-legal intuitions many
seem to have about such cases would find expression in the law. While
Anglo-American law is typically uncomfortable with doctrines that ad
mit of individualized application, I have been concerned to suggest that
such an approach may already be implicit in our moral intuitions about
self-defense.

